Category Archives: Security

Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card

Here in my house — Chez Tittel, that is — I have 11 computers running. Of that number, 10 have Secure Boot enabled and running. 8 have updated to the 2023 Secure Boot certificate authorities (aka 2023 CA) to replace the soon-to-be-obsolete 2011 CAs. Let’s call this status the Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card. Next, I will provide more details.

Presenting Chez Tittel Secure Boot Report Card

You can see that the report card takes the form of a table in three columns. (Open the lead-in graphic in its own browser tab to see the whole shebang.)  Col1 shows the machine name for each PC. Col2 indicates whether or not Secure Boot is enabled. Col3 covers whether or not the new 2023 CA is present or missing.

Here’s a breakdown, with percentages:

  • 10 of 11 machines have Secure Boot enables and running (~91%)
  • 8 of 11 machines have the new 2023 CA in their secure stores
  • 2 of 11 machines are waiting on WU to send them an update. It will add CA 2023 to their secure credentials. (2018 vintage X380 Yoga and the 2020 vintage X12 Hybrid Tablet.)
  • The only holdout is RyzenOfc, whose Asrock B550 motherboard won’t go into UEFI with the ancient NVIDIA GeForce 1070Ti currently installed. I’ve ordered a newer 4070 board and expect to complete the install process to enable Secure Boot and bring CA 2023 on board once it gets here.

Assessing a Mini-Fleet Experience

I was pretty surprised that the OEM PCs made working with Secure Boot and the 2023 CA update more or less routine. I only had to enable Secure Boot on a couple of machines, and the all of their update processes went smoothly. This involved machines from Lenovo (7) and one each from Dell and Asus.

The Asrock B550 PCs were a whole ‘nother story. I now know it’s at least partly because the old Pascal firmware on the 1070 GPUs doesn’t mesh well with UEFI in general. But I also now know that the B550 UEFI itself is a finicky and sometimes cantankerous beast.

Getting the first instance (Flo6, my production desktop) working with SB and 2023 CA  was close to the adventure of a lifetime. I sincerely hope that when the new GPU appears here at Chez Tittel, the second iteration will be easier, less vexing, and nowhere near as drawn-out as the first one was. We’ll see: here in Windows-World anything can happen — and often does!

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KB5074105 Brings On Secure Boot

Just when I’d more or less given up, along comes KB5074105 on January 29. In its “Normal rollout” fork, the first item to appear is entitled [Secure Boot]. That item (partly depicted above) also explicitly mentions boot manager updates for UEFI CA 2023. And indeed, after I installed and rebooted from that update, I was finally, finally able to get Secure Boot working on the Flo6 desktop. It ain’t necessarily easy or quick, but KB5074105 brings on Secure Boot capability to at least some machines that need it.

With Some Effort, KB5074105 Brings On Secure Boot

You’d think it would be as easy as falling off a log to get Secure Boot (SB) working after the update. You’d be wrong. I had to go through eight (8!) steps after that to set things to rights:

1. Reboot into UEFI and enable Secure Boot
After KB5074105 updated the boot binaries, I could finally toggle Secure Boot ON without triggering a pre‑GOP (graphics output protocol) stall. This was the first sign the trust chain was now compatible with the 2023 CA.

2. Switch Secure Boot Mode to Custom
This exposed the key‑management interface, allowing me to directly manipulate PK, KEK, db, and dbx. Standard mode hides these controls.

3. Install the factory default Secure Boot keys
Reloaded the OEM/Microsoft default PK, KEK, db, and dbx. This rebuilt the entire Secure Boot hierarchy from a known‑good, signed set.

4. Save and reboot to exit Setup Mode
Once the keys were installed, the firmware left Setup Mode and re‑entered User Mode, meaning Secure Boot enforcement was now active.

5. Boot Windows with Secure Boot enabled
Windows successfully validated its updated boot chain (thanks to KB5074105) and completed a full boot under Secure Boot for the first time on Flo6.

And That’s Still NOT the End of the Ride…

6. Rebuild the TPM trust state
Because Secure Boot changed the PCR profile, Windows had to re‑establish TPM‑sealed secrets. This required signing in with my password and letting Windows reseal keys.

7. Reprovision Windows Hello for each MSA
Both my primary and secondary MSAs needed fresh Hello containers because the TPM and Secure Boot trust anchors had changed. Each account required a password login followed by PIN setup.

8. Rebuild WAM tokens for Store/Xbox/MSA services
Once Hello was re‑established, the MS Web Account Manager (WAM) regenerated its token sets. This cleared the Xbox PIN loop and restored cloud‑service authentication. Indeed WAM allows apps to silently authenticate using Hello-based credentials.

A lot of this is new to me, because I’ve never had to set up SB on a PC before. My other PCs from Lenovo and Dell have done a fine job of doing it for me. This is the first time I’ve done it for myself… and it’s been much more of an adventure than I expected. Wow!

 

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SAC Gains Gradual Rollout Toggle

SAC stands for Smart App Control. It appears in Windows Security under the App & browser control heading. Over on WindowsLatest this morning, I read about a new change with mounting excitement. Starting with Build 26220.7070, SAC may now be turned on and off at will. Before this new change, once turned off, reinstalling Windows (clean install) was the only way to turn SAC back on. But alas, it seems that SAC gains gradual rollout toggle, because that feature is not available to me. Look at the lead-in graphic the text under the “Off” toggle on my ThinkPad T14s. It still reads “If SAC is off it can’t be turned on without reinstalling Windows.” Drat!

Not Yet Included, As SAC Gains Gradual Rollout Toggle

As it turns out the same thing is true for my Lenovo X380 Yoga, running Build 26220.7344. Apparently, neither of my qualified test PCs meets the initial gating criteria for the new version of SAC. Sigh.

The clean install requirement (and the one my machines must meet) for turning SAC back on, once it’s turned off, is a kind of deal-breaker for me. I do understand that Windows wants SAC to start with a clean slate. Indeed, that’s why this requirement is exacted. But it seems MS can now get past this immense previous hurdle.

Thus, my question is: When will my eligible test PCs get their turn? Here in Windows-World, answering such questions inevitably means waiting … and waiting … and waiting … until that turn rolls around. If history is any guide, it will take a while. I’ll keep you posted, but don’t hold your breath.

 

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Windows 11 Smart App Control

I’m always learning something new or surprising about Windows. In this case, I’m talking about Windows 11 since 22H2 came along in September 2022. That’s nearly 3 years ago, so to discover something mostly missing in new-ish (and brand-new) eval PCs from OEMs such as Lenovo, dynabook, and Panasonic is my surprise of the day. I’m talking about a feature in Windows Security — namely Windows 11 Smart App Control — about which I’ve been mostly oblivious until today.

This morning, I re-read a piece from Paul Thurrot from last Thursday (June 26) entitled  You Use Windows. Be Resilient (it’s Premium content, so you’ll need to sign up for a membership to read this: sorry). Under the heading of app protection, it off-handedly mentioned Smart App Control as follows:

Windows 11 has a feature called Smart App Control that’s in a weird state of flux and may or may not be configurable on your PC. Open Windows Security and navigate to App & browser control > Smart App Control, and see whether you can enable it. If you can, do so.

“Hmmm” I thought to myself, I don’t recognize this. “I’ll go look.” On the vast majority of new machines (all issued in 2023 or later) I found that — as you can see in the lead-in graphic– Smart App Control was turned off. And right below that status: a can of interesting worms. Gotcha!

A Gotcha in Windows 11 Smart App Control

That can of worms is, of course, the explanation beneath the “Off” toggle that reads “If Smart App Control is off it can’t be turned on without reinstalling Windows.” Really?!?!

That’s right. Apparently, enough people have noticed this distressing detail that MS has put together a FAQ around this very topic. It’s the one that’s accessible from the link at the bottom of the lead graphic that says Learn more about why Smart App Control is off.

TLDR: Smart App Control hooks into the OS at a deep enough level that if it’s not there when the OS gets laid down, a new, clean install is necessary to put it there from inception to make sure it works like it should. In other words, if your install of Windows 11 predates 22H2 — as so many of mine do — or the OEM doesn’t enable this feature as part of their initial Windows 11 image install — you can’t have it without an OS do-over.

What’s in My Field of (New/ish) View?

With this item in mind I examined all of my newest PCs, only to find that just one of them supports Smart App Control (SAC), albeit in “Eval mode.” Here’s what that looks like:

Of all my relatively new PCs only the dynabook X40M2 supports SAC (in evaluation mode).

Here’s a list of those PCs, for the record:

  • The preceding graphic shows I’ve got it in “Evaluation” mode on the dynabook X40M2 laptop I received earlier this month.
  • It’s turned off on the Lenovo ThinkPad T14s (original Windows 11 install date November 2024)
  • It’s turned off on the Lenovo ThinkStation P3 Ultra (original Windows 11 install date November 2023)

I just got an eval from Lenovo for its new Copilot+ capable AIO (Model Lenovo Yoga AIO 9i last Friday. I haven’t unboxed it yet, so I can’ t yet say if it has it turned off or not. I’ll report back later.

Small Sample Size Warning & Wondering

The sample size is ludicrously small (3 machines so far, with a fourth on the way later this week). But it’s now a bit clearer to me why I haven’t run into Smart App Control before. It’s just not that widely dispersed in the field yet. And I bet a lot of other long-time Windows Pros like me don’t know they can’t have it on older PCs unless they bring it in via a clean Windows 11 install.

Very interesting! Let’s just hope the dynabook survives Evaluation mode with Smart App Control intact, so I can learn more about how it works, and what it really does. And isn’t that just the way things often work, here in Windows-World? You betcha!

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E-mail Link Cynicism Is Well-Considered

I’ll admit it: I’m a cynic when it comes to emails that ask me to follow a link to verify something. If somebody asks for verification unsolicited, I believe by default that request is malign. So when an email showed up asking me to verify my account to keep my email server going, my first instinct was “Heck NO!” And, as the NordVPN link-checker immediately confirmed , my instincts are good. It pops up instantly as a phishing site. Skepticism is spot on, and e-mail link cynicism is well-considered — at least IMO.

Check to See if E-mail Link Cynicism Is Well-Considered

If in doubt, check the link at a third-party site. NEVER click a link from an unknown sender. If you’re incurably curious, do it from a sandbox or VM you can blow away if something bad happens. The important thing is to think about what’s in your inbox, how it got there, and how it might bite you.

Here’s what the NordVPN site says. It’s great advice so I’ll repeat it verbatim:

Got a suspicious email or text? Check the link before clicking — it will significantly reduce the chances of you falling for a phishing attack.

When in doubt, check. If you can’t check, don’t click: wait until you can (or delete the email). If it’s really important and legit, the sender will resend and you’ll get another opportunity to recheck what’s going on.

Reverse Lookup Mojo

Indeed, if you are concerned about a reported issue or account problem, it’s much safer for YOU to visit a known, good, working vendor site to check on status. Amazon is a good example: I can’t tell you how many bogus SMS text messages I’ve gotten on my cell that ask for Amazon account details to confirm things, because I delete them as soon as they appear. As a matter of policy Amazon does not request sensitive info (passwords, credit card data, etc.) via SMS, though they do report  order and delivery status that way.

Be smart when you respond to emails. If there’s any doubt, open your own link to a trusted vendor and check things from your end. If you don’t recognize a sender asking for sensitive info, don’t respond. This is a case where doing nothing is exactly what’s right — and safest.

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Leave Post KB5055523 Inetpub Folder Alone

I’d seen reporting on this yesterday, along with blithe assumptions about related cleanup (deletion). Today, MS has published a CVE-2025-21204 security note that explains what’s going on, and specifically advises users to leave post KB5055523 Inetpub folder alone — and intact.

Here’s a direct quote from the afore-linked source:

After installing the updates listed in the Security Updates table for your operating system, a new %systemdrive%\inetpub folder will be created on your device. This folder should not be deleted regardless of whether Internet Information Services (IIS) is active on the target device. This behavior is part of changes that increase protection and does not require any action from IT admins and end users.

Note: KB5055523 is a security update for Build 26100.3775 (production level Windows 11 24H2) released as part of the Patch Tuesday collection on April 8, 2025.

Why Leave Post KB5055523 Inetpub Folder Alone?

It’s part of the infrastructure upon which MS relies to fend off the named vulnerability. In other words, if the folder is present, MS can use it to protect against potential attacks. MS is sometimes fond of leaving folders behind in the wake of various installs (especially feature upgrades). Anything not needed is usually fair game for Disk Cleanup or the Windows Store PC Manager app.

That said, some OCD-friendly Windows users (you know who you are) relentlessly clean up things just because they must. This is apparently a case that flies against that impetus. MS, in this particular case, says “Leave it alone.” I guess I shall, and you probably should, too.

Though the Inetpub folder is empty after the update runs (see next screencap) it is meant to be and stay there. You’ve been warned! Indeed, as you can see, it’s properties are also set to “Read-only.”

The ‘Read-only’ status signals weakly that this item should stay put.

Final Warning: Don’t!

I’ve seen various online sources assert that it’s OK to delete this folder because it caused no observable ill effects on their test PCs. If what MS says about Inetpub’s presence or absence on a PC is true, you don’t want to sight what could happen if it were to be deleted. Let this particular sleeping critter keep snoozing, please.

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PowerShell-Based Defender Commands

The other day, my Canary Channel X380 Yoga hung up on Windows Update. In other words, after  some kind of WU download difficulty, it wouldn’t download from those servers. There are lots of ways to unstick WU, but one of the easiest is to get Windows Defender to update. Personally, I prefer to use a single PowerShell command with no arguments or parameters, rather than navigating into Windows Security to see if that might help. Indeed, there is a plethora of Defender controls in PowerShell. The one I used is just a single instance in a collection of over a dozen items.

Finding PowerShell-Based Defender Commands

You can see the command I used to ask PowerShell to update Defender in the lead-in graphic. It’s named Update-MpSignature, and it takes no mandatory arguments or parameters. What you’re looking at there, in fact, is the general PowerShell Module Browser at MS Learn. It’s dialed into Defender commands, shown in the breadcrumbs up top: Learn/Windows/PowerShell/Defender. As you will soon find out, there is a baker’s dozen of such things there under this heading.

Other Defender Commands get their own listings, but also appear in a handy-dandy table (simplified contents reproduced verbatim below). Indeed, each one also has its individual command reference, for which you find links in said table.

As you can see there are lots of interesting and sometimes useful ways to interact with Defender in PowerShell. They’re worth exploring and getting to know. I used a simple one to unstick WU this week, but there are lots of other tools here, ready to help you manipulate Defender in Windows Terminal or via automation scripts. Have at it!

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Avoid Mystery Pop-up Windows

It’s now a truism that one should NEVER click links in email from unknown or untrusted sources. This morning, I was reminded the same is true inside a browser. There, one should avoid mystery pop-up windows with equal attention and suspicion. Indeed, this happened as I visited one of my daily Windows-related news and info sites, much to my alarm and dismay.

Why Avoid Mystery Pop-Up Windows?

Any time you’re presented with a link you don’t recognize, didn’t ask for — and probably also, don’t want —  leave it alone. In my case, I clicked CTRL-Shift-ESC to launch Task Manager. Then, I killed all related browser processes. After that, I restarted Firefox anew. It’s never smart to take any such bait, nor to let it linger on your desktop.

Indeed, Task Manager might have refused to kill one or more Firefox processes. Then,  my next step would be: restart my PC, then run an immediate virus scan. As it was, an immediate follow-up scan showed Defender still on the job. It revealed neither lurking threats nor suspicious files. Good-oh!

You’ve Been Pwned!

Right here at edtittel.com, I fought off a series of WordPress-induced injection attacks last year. I ended up having to buy into a security service that prevented hijackers from altering URLs published into social media sites (e.g. X, Facebook and LinkedIn). These redirected would-be blog post visitors to certain potentially unsavory stop-offs en route to my daily posts. It now costs me $300 a year to protect website visitors from such stuff and nonsense.

I say this to explain that such things can happen to almost any website, at any time, as unpatched vulnerabilities get exploited. Knowing that this is always a possibility, savvy users recognize that mystery pop-ups hide much more malice and potential for harm than sources for wonder and beauty. Avoid them at all costs, is received security wisdom — and my best advice as well. That goes double if they come bearing offers that seem too good to be true…

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Windows Resiliency Initiative Includes Quick Machine Recovery

It’s that time of year again, when MS meetings and conferences — Ignite 2024, in this case — heat things up with future promises and new idea campaigns. Yesterday’s Windows Experience Blog from David Weston (MS VP Enterprise & OS Security) is a case in point. Entitled Windows security and resiliency: Protecting your business, it asserts that a new Windows Resiliency Initiative includes Quick Machine Recovery as a key capability. Very interesting!

Explaining Windows Resiliency Initiative Includes Quick Machine Recovery

This new initiative “takes four areas of focus” as its goal — namely (all bullet points quoted verbatim from the afore-linked blog post, except for my [bracketed] commentary):

  • Strengthen reliability based on learnings from the incident we saw in July. [Crowdstrike kernel mode error took down 8.5M Windows PCs.]
  • Enabling more apps and users to run without admin privileges.
  • Stronger controls for what apps and drivers are allowed to run.
  • Improved identity protection to prevent phishing attacks.

The first and arguably most impactful preceding item is what led MS to its announcement of Quick Machine Recovery. Here’s how Weston explains it:

This feature will enable IT administrators to execute targeted fixes from Windows Update on PCs, even when machines are unable to boot, without needing physical access to the PC. This remote recovery will unblock your employees from broad issues much faster than what has been possible in the past. Quick Machine Recovery will be available to the Windows Insider Program community in early 2025.

In other words, this new feature should enable what savvy administrators had to do using OOB access to affected machine via KVMs smart enough to bootstrap machines otherwise unable to boot.

Great Addition: How’s the Execution?

IMO this is something MS should’ve built into Windows long ago. I’m curious to see how (and how well) it works. I’m also curious to see if it will be available for Windows 10 as well as 11. Only time will tell, but I’ll be all over this when it hits Insider Builds early next year. Good stuff — I hope!!

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CVE-2024-6768 Exposes Scary Windows Vulnerability

In reading through my usual Windows news and info sources this morning I came across a scary notification at MS Power User. The named item is from the national vulnerability database. CVE-2024-6738 — which makes it item 6,738 for 2024 — comes with scary implications. It’s been reported in some form since last February. It attacks by altering meta-data for Windows base log files (BLFs) and can cause doom loops like those recently experienced from a Crowdstrike update last month. Thus, CVE-2024-6768 exposes scary Windows vulnerability that is hard to fend off and tricky to repair.

BLF Alteration in CVE-2024-6768 Exposes Scary Windows Vulnerability

A base log file (BLF) sits at the heart of the Windows Common Log File System (aka CLFS). As MS Learn’s “Creating a Log File” article begins, it says:

Before you can use CLFS, you must create a log file using the CreateLogFile function. A log file is made up of a base log file that contains metadata, and a number of containers that hold the actual data. On any local file system, containers can be in one or more separate files; on NTFS, containers can be in one or more streams within a file.

The BLF contains key information that describes the associated containers for log data. If the BLF is wrong, the log won’t make sense and cannot be read. This doesn’t sound like a big deal, but it is. Let me explain further…

Several Interesting Copilot Responses…

When asked to describe BLF files, Copilot notes how they’re used:

Usage: These files are crucial for maintaining system stability and integrity. They help manage user-level registry information and other system-level data. For example, the Windows component that writes user-level registry information to the NTUSER.DAT file uses CLFS logging, which involves BLF files1.

Indeed it seems that CVE-2024-6768 wreaks havoc by breaking the base log handler with a bogus “size of data field” value. This kind of error triggers a BugCheck error, and in turn provokes a BSOD.

Further investigation shows that any time a registry change occurs BLF files get updated. They are also essential to system boot-up, application installation and update, as well as system update. To get more details ask Copilot: “When do Windows base log files get written, and when do they get read?” You’ll see what I mean right away.

What Does the Future Hold?

The Fortra release note for this vulnerability shows its history, while a companion research note shows more details. So far, MS has yet to respond. Other than research work, I see no evidence of successful exploits in the wild. That said, this kind of attack is nearly impossible to fix without knowing the exact details of the registry values changed to mung some (or more) specific .BLF file(s).

IMO, this means the only real protection is a recent image backup that will replace the altered Windows image with a known, good working copy. Stuff like this is why I keep such things handy, and make one at least daily. This could get interesting…stay tuned!

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